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JURISDICTION AND 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This case involves an appeal from a final judgment 
of dismissal after a civil jury triafL. 
Appellate jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to 
§78-2-2(3)(i) Utah Code Ann. This case was poured over to 
the Court of Appeals pursuant to §78r2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an auto^truck accident. The 
jury returned a verdict "no cause of action" for defendants. 
Plaintiff appeals. 
Plaintiff (Ostler) asks this Court to direct a 
verdict that defendant (Wheeler) was iconcurrently negligent 
as a matter of law. In the alternative, plaintiff (Ostler) 
seeks a new trial. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err by excluding certain 
evidence proferred on the issue of prbximate cause? 
2. Did the trial court err by unduly restricting 
impeachment evidence? 
xii 
3. Did the trial court err by permitting certain 
prejudicial statements in closing argument? 
4- Did the trial court err by incorrectly 
instructing the jury on proximate cause, independent 
intervening cause, and a trucker's federal duty to set out 
warning devices? 
5. Did the trial court err by failing to direct a 
verdict in plaintiff's (appellant's) favor? 
FACTS1 
Ralph Ostler (hereafter Ostler) was a passenger 
riding with his father Stephen Ostler (hereafter father 
Ostler) on the interstate freeway. Stanley Wheeler (hereaf-
ter Wheeler) was driving a semi-truck on the freeway 
travelling the same direction as father Ostler. 
Sometime around 2:00 a.m., P.S.T., Wheeler stopped 
his semi-truck off the travelled lanes of the highway and on -
the paved shoulder. (Sometimes referred to as the emergency 
lane.) 
xiii 
-^All citations to the record are included at Point I, 
below. 
Wheeler claims that he stopped for only about three 
minutes to urinate. Wheeler claims |that he turned on his 
flashing taillights, but he did not fset out any flares or 
other emergency signals. 
Father Ostler somehow drifted into the emergency 
lane and crashed into the rear of th£ parked semi-truck. 
Father Ostler was killed. Ralph OstJLer was paralyzed from 
the waist down. 
This case involves only th^ claim by Ralph Ostler 
against Wheeler and Wheeler's employers. No claim for father 
Ostler is included herein. 
At trial, Ralph Ostler conceded that father Ostler 
was negligent and partly at fault foir drifting into the 
emergency lane. After the first witness testified, the 
court directed a verdict that Wheeled was also negligent for 
making an illegal stop. Thusf a centjral issue at trial was 
proximate cause. Specifically, was father Ostler the sole 
proximate cause of the injuries; or v^ as Wheeler the sole 
proximate cause of the injuries, or v^ ere father Ostler and 
Wheeler combined the proximate cause |of the injuries? 
(Sometimes called concurrent negligenbe.) 
The jury returned a verdict that father Ostler was 
the sole proximate cause of the injuries. Ostler brings this 
appeal claiming several errors in the| trial court. 
xiv 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: 
The trial court excluded vjirtually all of Ostler's 
evidence on proximate cause. The rujling was based on Rule 
702, Utah Rules of Evidence. Howevelr, most of the evidence 
was not within the common knowledge |of the jury. Moreover, 
the evidence should be admitted if i|t would be "helpful" to 
the jury. 
POINT TWO; 
The trial court excluded certain preliminary fact 
questions from the jury. However, pursuant to Rule 104(b), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, these preliminary fact issues are for 
the jury. 
POINT THREE: 
The trial court did not peirmit Ostler to impeach as 
permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
POINT FOUR: 
In closing argument, Wheeler's attorney misstated 
the law of proximate cause. The cour[t failed to correct that 
error. 
xv 
POINT FIVE: 
In closing argument, Wheeller's attorney argued that 
any judgment would come from his client's pocket. That was 
not true. Any judgment would come fp 
company. 
rom the insurance 
POINT SIX: 
permit Ostler to amend The trial court refused to! 
the Complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. Because 
of the jury's verdict, that issue was moot. However, if the 
case is remanded for a new trial, Ostler should be permitted 
to amend. The grounds for punitive damages are that 
Wheeler's conduct in driving in an exhausted condition was in 
reckless disregard of the public safety. 
POINT SEVEN: 
Federal statutes require truckers to set out flares 
or triangles when they stop in the emergency lane. The 
court's instruction substituted a reasonable man standard. 
However, state law is pre-empted in t|he field. 
xv i 
POINT EIGHT: 
Prior to trial, the insured in this case sent anti-
tort propaganda to all of its policyholders in Utah County. 
The trial court refused to permit vo^ Lr dire on that issue. 
POINT NINE: 
Ostler's expert made a videotape to show what would 
have happened if the semi-truck had hot been illegally 
parked. The film was excluded. Sincjre the circumstances of 
the film and the accident were essentially similar, the film 
should have been received. Differences go to weight—not 
admissibility. 
POINT TEN: 
The trial court's instruction on independent 
i i 
intervening cause was so confusing that no lay person could 
understand it. Furthermore, the instruction was incorrect 
because there are several types of intervening causes that do 
not break the chain of causation. 
POINT ELEVEN: 
Wheeler's illegal parking in the emergency lane set 
up a chain of events ended in the accident. Therefore 
xvii 
Wheeler must be a proximate cause (or concurrently negli-
gent) of the ciccident as a matter of law. 
xviii 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT EXCLUDED 
ALL EVIDENCE REGARDING 
PROXIMATE CAUSE 
Ostler admitted that his father was negligent and 
partly at fault in causing the accident. (Tr. 86.) However, 
Ostler claimed that Wheeler (the semi-truck driver) was 
concurrently negligent.* 
Early in the trial, the court directed a verdict 
that Wheeler was negligent. (Tr. 131-132.) The basis for 
the court's ruling was §41-6-103(1)(i), Utah Code Ann.; 
No person shall: stop, stand or park a 
vehicle. . .or park a vehicle. . .on any 
controlled access highway. . . 
However, the court reserved the issue of whether or not 
Wheeler's negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries. 
(Tr. 132). 
-•-Concurrent negligence has been (defined by our Supreme 
Court as follows: 
"The law does not recognize only one 
proximate cause of an injury, consisting 
of only one factor, one actj, or the 
conduct of only one person.| To the 
contrary, the acts of two dr more persons 
may work concurrently as the efficient 
cause of an injury, and in such case, 
each of the participating acts or 
omissions is regarded in lalw as a 
proximate cause and both may be held 
liable. 
Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Ut. 1984). 
Thus, a major portion of the trial revolved around 
proximate cause. Virtually, all of Ostler's evidence on 
proximate cause was rejected by the trial court. 
A. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Moth Phenomenon. 
Ostler proferred evidence that father Ostler was 
not asleep; rather, he was in a reduced state of alertness 
which is rather common to drivers at night on long stretches 
of road. During nighttime driving, the eyes of the driver 
generally focus on the taillights of the cars ahead. 
However, in this reduced state of alertness, a tired driver 
may not be able to tell whether the taillights ahead are 
parked or moving. Thus, father Ostler drove straight toward 
the lights of the parked truck, thinking all the time that he 
was following moving traffic. In this reduced state of 
alertness, he was not aware that the truck was parked on the 
shoulder of the road until it was too late. (Tr. 227-228.) 
This is sometimes called the "moth phenomenon."2 (Tr. 273.) 
There was some testimony that the parked semi-truck 
may have had blinking or flashing taillights on. However, 
zThis condition is also called "highway hypnosis." (Tr. 
237. ) 
2 
that fact does not necessarily mean that it was parked. Some 
slow moving vehicles use flashing taillights. (Tr. 228-229.) 
Furthermore, flashing taillights somehow "lure" a sleepy 
driver more than steady taillights. (Tr. 229-230.) For 
example, California Highway Patrol cars are struck ap-
proximately 15 times per month while parked with flashing 
lights. Upon the advice of Ostler's expert, the California 
Highway Patrol has done away with off-and-on flashers. (Tr. 
231.) 
If the Wheeler truck had n<t>t been illegally parked 
in the emergency lane, father Ostler!would probably have 
recovered from his highway hypnosis without consequence. 
(Tr. 2 31.) 
The "moth phenomenon" is well-known in the field of 
highway design. (Tr. 231, 275 and 276.) Indeed, the Federal 
Department of Transportation has recently recognized the 
"moth phenomenon" as an industry-wid^ problem. (Tr. 284.) 
B. Exclusion of Evidence That Father Ostler Was Awake. 
Of course, the "moth phenomenon" only works if the 
driver's eyes are open. If the driver's eyes are closed (or 
asleep), the "moth phenomenon" could have no effect. Thus, a 
3 
preliminary fact issue was whether or not father Ostler was 
asleep when he hit the back of Wheeler's truck. 
Ralph Ostler's experts testified that father 
Ostler was not asleep; but rather in a reduced state of 
awareness (sometimes called highway hypnosis). The basis for 
that testimony was as follows: First, Wheeler testified, by 
offer of proof, that father Ostler appeared as if he were 
awake: 
MR. WHEELER: "Well, it appeared to me as 
if the guy was driving in a daze. He 
cut over like he went, opps(sic), I'm off 
the road, and cut over figuring this 
truck was on the road, and just pulled 
right directly in behind me. And there 
was nothing I could do, just sit there 
and hold on." 
QUESTION: "Was it a sudden cut or did he 
sort of gradually veer off?" 
ANSWER: "No, it was like he was changing 
lanes, like you change lanes going down 
the freeway." 
QUESTION: "Now prior to the time he made 
this fairly sudden lane change, what lane 
had he been in?" 
ANSWER: "I couldn't tell you that. I 
really couldn't. It looked, I just don't 
know, but you know it was very apparent 
that he was pulling, trying to get in 
behind me, that's the way I'm looking at 
it any way. It looked like he thought to 
himself, 'I'm off the road and that 
4 
truck's on the road, and I'd better get 
in behind him.'M3 
(Tr. 256.) 
Second, the shallow angle of impact indicates to a 
reconstructionist that the driver was awake. If a driver 
fell asleep, the car would probably make a more sudden turn. 
(Tr. 249-250.) Ostler's expert was able to monitor this 
phenomenon in his sleep laboratory. (Tr. 251.) 
Third, there was testimony that father Ostler had 
stated he was not tired at the previous road stop. (Tr. 
250.) 
Fourth, there was a curve in the roadway just prior 
to the accident scene. If father Ostler had been asleep, he 
would have run straight off the road at the curve. (Tr. 
252.) 
Fifth, there was testimony |that a sleeping truck 
driver would relax to such an extent that he would not keep 
his foot on the gas. (Tr. 283.) In this case, the Ostler 
vehicle was travelling at approximatejly 4 8 miles per hour at 
impact. (R. 1029.) The inference is| that father Ostler was 
^Wheeler's observations were made through his rear view 
mirror. However, Ostler's expert has done special research 
with respect to mirrors on trucks. (Tr. 253.) 
5 
not asleep or the Ostler vehicle would have slowed down more. 
(Tr. 283.) 
The court rejected all of this evidence. Thus, the 
court stated: 
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis 
for a determination on his part that 
there was a man that was either, that was 
not asleep, or that he was merely 
somewhat impaired in his appreciation of 
things around him. 
(Tr. 245.) 
This issue is controlled by Rule 104(b), Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
Preliminary Questions. When the 
relevancy of evidence depends upon the 
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the 
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, 
the introduction of evidence sufficient 
to support a finding of the fulfillment 
of the condition. 
The Federal Advisory Committee Comment on this 
section is instructive. 
If preliminary questions of conditional 
relevancy were determined solely by the 
judge, as provided in subdivision (a), 
the functioning of the jury as a trier of 
fact would be greatly restricted and in 
some cases virtually destroyed. These 
are appropriate questions for juries. 
Accepted treatment, as provided in the 
rule, is consistent with that given fact 
questions generally. The judge makes a 
preliminary finding of fulfillment of the 
condition. If so, the item is admitted. 
If after all the evidence on the issue is 
in, pro and con, the jury could reasonab-
6 
ly conclude that fulfillment of the 
condition is not established, the issue 
is for them. If the evidence is not such 
as to allow a finding, the judge 
withdraws the matter from their con-
sideration. 
(Compare Tr. 291.) See also Huddleston v. United States, 
U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988 
In determining whether the) government has 
introduced sufficient evidence to meet 
Rule 104(b), the trial court neither 
weighs credibility nor makes a finding 
that the government has proved the 
conditional fact by a preponderance of 
the evidence. The court simply examines 
all the evidence in the case and decides 
whether the jury could reasonably find 
the conditional fact. . .by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 
Whether father Ostler was asleep or awake is a 
preliminary fact issue. Here, the judge should have made a 
"preliminary determination" that there was sufficient basis^ 
for the jury to conclude that father Ostler was awake. Thus, 
the jury should have been permitted ^o hear the evidence and 
make their own decision. 
Whether Wheeler was a proximate cause of Ostler's 
injuries is the ultimate fact issue. Ostler claims that 
Wheeler was a proximate cause, on th4 theory that the "moth 
4The basis was, first, that fatHer Ostler appeared to be 
awake; second, a shallow angle of impact; third, father 
Ostler said he was not tired; and fourth, father Ostler must 
have been awake to negotiate the curye. (See above.) 
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phenomenon" lured father Ostler into the illegally parked 
truck. After the jury heard evidence on the preliminary 
fact issue (viz. whether father Ostler was asleep or awake), 
the jury should then have heard the expert evidence on the 
ultimate issue (viz. "moth effect"). 
C. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Violation of Federal 
Regulation. 
Ostler's expert proffered testimony describing the 
purpose of federal trucking regulations. Specifically, the 
purpose of these regulations is to keep exhausted drivers 
off the road. (Tr. 159.) 
The Federal regulations which relate to this case 
are: 
49 C.F.R. §395.3(a)(1) (sometimes called the 10-Hour Rule): 
No motor carrier shall permit or require 
any driver used by it to drive nor shall 
any driver drive. . .more than 10 hours 
following eight consecutive hours off 
duty. 
49 C.F.R. §395.3(a)(2) (sometimes called the 15-Hour Rule): 
No motor carrier shall permit or require 
any driver used by it to drive, nor shall 
any driver drive. . .for any period after 
having been on duty 15 hours following 
eight consecutive hours off duty. 
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49 C.F.R. §395.3(b) (sometimes called the 70-Hour Rule): 
No motor carrier shall permit or require 
any driver used by it to bb on duty. . . 
more than 70 hours in any period of eight 
consecutive days. 
49 C.F.R. §391.2 (fatigue): 
No driver shall operate a jnotor ve-
hicle. . .while the driver's ability or 
alertness is so impaired, or so likely to 
become impaired through fatigue, illness 
or any other cause, as to make it unsafe 
for him to begin or continue to operate 
the motor vehicle. 
Ostler's expert audited Whteeler's driving logs and 
came to the following conclusions: <pn the day of the 
accident, Wheeler was 25.25 hours ovtr the 10-hour limit; 
26.75 hours over the 15-hour limit; and 86.25 hours over the 
70-hour limit. (Tr. 160.) Because <f)f these violations, 
Wheeler was absolutely exhausted at the time of the accident. 
(Tr. 5.) Because Wheeler was exhausted, he had to stop and 
have coffee shortly before the accident. That coffee acted 
as a diuretic causing Wheeler to stob and urinate. (Tr. 
125.) Furthermore, in such an exhausted condition, Wheeler's 
judgment was not good. In summary, the cause of Wheeler 
pulling off the road to make the illegal stop was because he 
was exhausted, his judgment wasn't g6od, and he drank coffee 
until his bladder wasn't good. (Tr. 126.) 
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The trial court refused to receive this testimony 
regarding violations of the federal regulations. (Tr. 23, 
29, 38, 118, 172.) 
D. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Purpose of the Emergency 
Lane: 
Ostler's expert proferred testimony on the purpose 
of the emergency lane. According to the expert, the purpose 
of the emergency lane was to accommodate disabled vehicles; 
and to serve as a safe recovery zone for errant vehicles. 
(Tr. 222-223-) 
The court refused to receive the testimony. (Tr. 
254. ) 
E. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Foreseeability (Road 
Designers). 
Ostler's expert proferred testimony that road 
designers assume that errant vehicles will from time-tor-time 
run into the emergency lane when they design highways. (Tr. 
224.) 
This testimony was also rejected. (Tr. 254.) 
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F. Exclusion of Evidence of Foresefeability (Truck Drivers) 
Ostler's expert (Hewitt5) hroferred testimony that 
it is foreseeable to a reasonable truck driver, parked on the 
paved shoulder (emergency lane) thatiother errant vehicles 
might stray and hit him. Hewitt testified that this is a 
common subject that comes up at almost every seminar. (Tr. 
286.) This testimony was also rejected. (Tr. 293.) 
Hewitt also proferred a handout which he passes out 
at every meeting he has attended as he trains companies and 
trains their drivers in safety procedures. (Tr. 864-865.) 
The handout (Exhibit 82) is attached 
brief. The handout states: "Never ^top on freeways or 
interstates." Exhibit 82 was also refused by the trial 
court. 
Wheeler admitted that his practice was to stop at 
rest stops and not alongside the roaq—"for safety reasons." 
(Wheeler depo., p. 36.) 
as Exhibit A to this 
5Hewitt is a member of the Natiolnal Accident Review 
Board (Tr. 270); past president of the Arizona Motor 
Transportation Assn.; a member of the| National Committee of 
Motor Carrier Fleet Training; and developer of over 200 
audio-visual training programs for mo|tor fleet training. 
(Tr. 271-272.) 
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G. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Test Results 
Ostler's experts re-created the accident to see 
what would have happened if Wheeler's truck had not been 
illegally parked. The experiment showed that father Ostler 
would have run harmlessly into a field if the truck had not 
been parked illegally. (R. 1028-1031.) This evidence was 
also excluded. (R. 1197.)6 
H. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Emergency Devices 
49 C.F.R. §392.22(b) governs a truck driver's duty 
to set out warning devices. The regulation states: 
[W]henever a vehicle is stopped upon the 
shoulder of a highway [or emergency lane] 
for any cause other than necessary 
traffic stops, the driver shall as soon 
as possible, but in any event within 10 
minutes, place the warning devices 
[flares, or lanterns or triangles]. 
Ostler's expert testified that the accident would 
have been avoided if the warning devices had been used. (Tr. 
232-233/ 284.) The trial court refused to receive the expert 
testimony regarding warning devices. (Tr. 246.) 
This issue is separately discussed in Point IX, below. 
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I. The Excluded Evidence was Admissible. 
This case is controlled byj the Restatement of 
Torts,2d, §447:7 
Negligence of Intervening Acts. 
The fact that an intervening act of 
a third person is negligent in itself or 
is done in a negligent manher does not 
make it a superseding cause of harm to 
another which the actor's negligent 
conduct is a substantial factor in 
bringing about, if 
(a) the actor at the time of his 
negligent conduct should have realized 
that a third person might so act, or 
(b) a reasonable man|knowing the 
situation existing when the act of the 
third person was done woultpi not regard it 
as highly extraordinary th^t the third 
person had so acted, or 
(c) the intervening act is a normal 
consequence of a situation created by the 
actor's conduct and the manner in-which 
it is done is not extraordinarily 
negligent. 
The comment on Clause C, Restatement of Torts,2d, 
§447, states: 
The words "extraordinarily [negligent" 
denote the fact that men of ordinary 
experience and reasonable judgment, 
7This section of the Restatement! has been specifically 
adopted by our Supreme Court in Harris v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1983). 
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looking at the matter after the event and 
taking into account the prevalence of 
that "occasional negligence, which is one 
of the incidents of human life," would 
not regard it as extraordinary that the 
third person's intervening act should 
have been done in the negligent manner in 
which it was done. Since the third 
person's action is a product of the 
actor's negligent conduct, there is good 
reason for holding him responsible for 
its effects, even though it be done in a 
negligent manner, unless the nature or 
extent of the negligence is altogether 
unusual. 
The best example of §447(a) is Godesky v. Provo 
City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Utah 1984) which states: 
An intervening negligent act does not 
automatically become a superseding cause 
that relieves the original actor of 
liability. The earlier actor [viz. 
Wheeler] is charged with the foreseeable 
negligent acts of others [viz. father 
Ostler]. Therefore, if the intervening 
negligence is foreseeable, the earlier 
negligent act is a concurring cause. 
"[T]his includes situations where 
negligent or other wrongful conduct of 
others should reasonably be anticipated." 
[Citations omitted.] 
* • * * 
It is not necessary that the specific 
injury be foreseen as long as a person of 
ordinary prudence could foresee, as a 
result of his action or inaction, the 
possibility of some injury. . . 
There are numerous examples of §477(b) and (c): 
See e.g. Sheel v. Tremblay, 312 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1973)(it was 
not extraordinary that a car should veer slightly off a 
14 
winding road and strike negligently located utility pole.); 
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 67|L P.2d 217 (Utah 1983) 
(bus negligently stopped with rear ejid extended partially 
into street; however, defendant bus driver would be respon-
sible for a momentarily inattentive driver, which is not so 
"extraordinary" as to be unforeseeable). 
In summary, all of the prorerred evidence was 
relevant because it answers the questions set forth in §447 
of the Restatement. Specifically: 
A. Whether father Ostlerfs 
negligence was reasonably 
"foreseeable." Restatement, 
§447(a). 
B. Whether father Ostlerfs 
negligence was "highl^ extraor-
dinary." Restatement] §447(b). 
C. Whether father Ostler Is 
negligence was a normal (not 
extraordinary) consequence of 
the situation created by 
Wheeler's negligence and "not 
extraordinarily negligent." 
Restatement §447(c). 
J. Basis for the Trial Court's Exclusion of Evidence. 
Wheeler filed motions i_n lijmine to exclude the 
testimony of Ostler's experts in totcj. The motions were 
based on a variety of grounds. (R. 1|557 —1572 and R. 1531-
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1545. See also, Tr. 154.) However, the basis for the 
court's ruling was that the testimony would not be helpful to 
the jury. Specifically, the court stated: 
It seems to me that that's something that 
the jury can, just as well as anyone 
else, can infer and can determine from 
their own experience in this type of 
circumstance. . . 
• * • * 
. . .I'm still persuaded that this is 
something that the testimony of the 
expert is not going to be particularly 
helpful to the jury. 
(Tr. 245 and 293.) 
K. Qualifications of Stephen Ostler's Expert (Hulbert). 
Dr. Hulbert is a human factors research scien-
tist." A human factors scientist studies human behavior in 
the workplace. (Tr. 205.) Dr. Hulbert has contributed to 
virtually all signs, signals, and pavement markings which we 
encounter on today's highways. (Tr. 106.) For example, he 
bHuman factors engineering is a rather new discipline 
dating from World War II. However, courts routinely receive 
expert testimony from human factors scientists: See e.g. 
Wright v. Las Vegas Hacienda, 720 P.2d 697 (Nev. 19 86); 
Buchman v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 381 So.2d 229 (Fla. 
1980); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 
1977); Scott v. Sears & Roebuck, 789 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 
19 86); Collins v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 675 F.2d 1185 
(1982); Public Health Foundation, Etc. v. Cole, 352 So.2d 877 
(Fla. App. 1977). 
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helped develop the "Do Not Enter" reki and white signs along 
the freeway. (Tr. 207.) Human factbrs scientists must work 
|in developing traffic 
Dr. Hulbert's recent 
hand-in-hand with traffic engineers 
control devices. (Tr. 208.) One ofj 
assignments was to study truck drivejr alertness at Kennecott 
Copper Mines. (Tr. 209-210.) Dr. HUlbert has published 80-
90 publications in his field ihcludi 
falling asleep at the wheel. (Tr. 2 
hg several studies on 
11.) One of Dr. 
Hulbert's articles dealt with highway hypnosis. (Tr. 2 37.) 
Dr. Hulbert also operated a research driving simulation 
laboratory for the State of California. (Tr. 211-212.) In 
that laboratory, Hulbert made special studies of drivers 
falling asleep at the wheel. (Tr. 213-215.) Dr. Hulbert has 
testified twice before Congress. (Tr, 215-216.) Dr. Hulbert 
also served as a consultant to the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration. Dr. Hulbert also consulted with the 
California State Highway Patrol on tme special problem of 
sleepy drivers running into patrol cars parked in the 
emergency lane with flashers on. (Tr. 231.) 
Admissibility of the Excluded Evidence 
No one seriously contends tlhat the excluded 
evidence was not relevant. Rather, i|t appears that the Court 
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excluded the evidence pursuant to Rule 702, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. (See paragraph J, above.) Rule 702 states: 
If scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(Emphasis added.) 
At common law, expert testimony would be excluded 
if it involved a matter of common knowledge of the jurors. 
However, Rule 702 has changed all of that. Expert opinion 
may now be received on matters within the common knowledge of 
jurors if the expert testimony would assist the jurors to 
better understand the evidence. West's Handbook of Federal 
Evidence, §702.4 (2nd Ed. 1986). Thus, it has been held 
that, 
Under Rule 702, an expert can be employed 
if his testimony will be helpful to the 
trier of fact in understanding evidence 
that is simply difficult [though] not 
beyond ordinary understanding. 
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd Cir. 
1985) . 
In effect, Rule 702 has adopted the position long 
urged by Wigmore: 
The true test of admissibility of such 
testimony is not whether the subject 
matter is common or uncommon, or whether 
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many persons or few have s| 
of the matter; but, it is 
ome knowledge 
whether the 
witnesses offered as experts have any 
peculiar knowledge or experience, not 
common to the world, which renders their 
opinions founded on such knowledge or 
experience any aid to the 
jury in determining the qule 
issue. 
court or the 
lestions at 
7 Wigmore, Evidence, §1923, at 31-32| (Chadbourne Rev. 1978). 
In this case, jurors may have some common knowledge 
about sleepy drivers. However, therp is no reason to suppose 
that an average juror has any way to know that a sleepy 
driver might be "lured" into the taillights of a parked 
truck--like a moth to the flame. Indeed, Ostler's expert 
testified that he must frequently explain this phenomenon to 
accident investigators. (Tr. 281-28B.) If some accident 
investigators don't understand the "jnoth phenomenon," it 
cannot be common knowledge to the jujry. 
If the "moth phenomenon" testimony was not 
admissible on Ostler's case in chief I it should have been 
admissible on rebuttal. The defense sponsored certain 
nighttime photos. Those photos purpart to show how the truck 
appeared at night at 400-foot distance. (See Ex. 53; compare 
Tr. 814.) Next, Wheeler's expert testified that a driver 
should be able to stop within that s^me 400 feet. The 
assumption is that father Ostler was awake and should have 
seen the truck with plenty of time tq> stop. (Tr. 820.) If 
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father Ostler was asleep, Exhibit 53 wouldn't matter (because 
father Ostler didn't see the truck at 400 feet). Thus 
defendant's Exhibit 53 rests on exactly the same foundation 
as Ostler's "moth effect" testimony. (Compare Tr. 245.) 
Since Exhibit 53 came in, Ostler should have been permitted 
to bring in the "moth phenomenon" testimony on rebuttal. 
That was refused. (Tr. 850-852.) 
Furthermore, a jury probably has some common 
knowledge that flares would alert a sleepy driver to danger. 
However, it would be "helpful" for the jury to understand why 
a sleepy driver reacts differently to flares than to 
taillights. After Dr. Hulbert gave his opinion that flares 
or triangles would have avoided the accident, the following 
colloquy took place: 
THE COURT: Well, Doctor, do you have to 
be an expert to appreciate that? 
THE WITNESS: Well, not necessarily to 
appreciate it, your Honor. That's --
THE COURT: Or understand it, or accept 
it? 
THE WITNESS: Well, it's that way with 
human factors testimony, your Honor, that 
there is a good deal of reasonable common 
sense to it. 
Now, the problem is that not all 
persons have analyzed these matters. And 
the advent and use of these triangles and 
the research studies that have been done 
on them have not all, not been done that 
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many years ago. So we are dealing here 
with a fairly, excuse me, a fairly recent 
understanding of these matters in depth, 
that not necessarily would be expected to 
be available to the lay person. Sure, 
they can understand it once it's 
explained. But not necessarily would 
they have such an awareness without such 
explanation. (Tr. 233-234 ;) 
The average lay juror would not have any reason to 
understand the purpose of the emergency lane. The average 
juror probably thinks the emergency lane is to be used to 
stop and urinate or stretch. In fact, the very opposite is 
true. (See para. D, above.) In a v^ry similar case, it has 
been held reversible error to exclud^ expert testimony on the 
purpose of the emergency lane. Roby by and through Roby v. 
Kingsley, 492 So.2d 789 (Fla. App. 1986) (copy attached as 
Exhibit B). 
Nor, would the average juror have any reason to 
know that truckers get special instructions never to park in 
the emergency lane except for a true emergency. (See para. 
F, above.) 
In summary, most of the proferred testimony was 
outside the common knowledge of the jury. Perhaps some 
minor parts of the testimony were within the jury's common 
knowledge. Even so, the testimony wotald have been "helpful" 
to assist the jury to better understand the circumstances. 
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Thus, the testimony should have been received pursuant to 
Rule 702. 
M. Standard of Review for Excluded Evidence. 
The standard of review for erroneous exclusion of 
expert testimony is generally abuse of discretion. Utah 
Dept. of Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984). 
However, it has been said that: 
Basic policy questions that affect the 
very nature of a trial lie behind 
decisions to receive expert testimony. 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
experts not only explain evidence, but 
are themselves sources of evidence. 
These two roles, though related, are 
quite distinct. In deciding whether 
explanation by an expert will assist the 
jury or judge, the superior position of 
the trial judge over the appellate judge 
is apparent. By comparison, in deciding 
whether evidence should be allowed from 
the source, the trial judge draws less 
upon the scene and the cast immediately 
before him, and more upon the substantive 
law. To the extent that the decision to 
allow expert testimony as a source of 
evidence is significantly intertwined 
with the underlying substantive law, we 
will accord it less deference, and take a 
much closer look. 
In Re; Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 
1233-34 (5th Cir. 1986) . 
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N. Prejudice Because of Excluded Evidence. 
story, 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless 
a substantial right of a party is 
affected. 
In this case, Wheeler got to tell his side of the 
Wheeler's story is that he stropped his truck for only 
2-3 minutes on a straight stretch of road where he could see 
a.m. when the road was for over a mile. He stopped at 2:00 
virtually deserted. His truck was parked partly on the 
gravel and over four feet off the travelled way. He engaged 
his flashing lights. Father Ostler went to sleep at the 
wheel and crashed into the rear of the truck. (Tr. 92-97.) 
The jury heard all of this evidence. 
Ostler's side of the story iis somewhat different. 
Ostler's story is that Wheeler was driving in an exhausted 
condition. Indeed, at the time of th|e accident, Wheeler was 
26.25 hours over the Federal 10-hour limit Because of this 
exhaustion, Wheeler's judgment was injpaired. Wheeler, there-
fore, stopped on the emergency lane t|o urinate. In fact, the 
urge to urinate was caused because Whieeler had drunk too much 
coffee trying to stay awake. The emergency lane where 
Wheeler stopped was designed to be us|ed only for true 
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emergencies (not to urinate). Indeed, Wheeler had received 
training never to stop on the emergency lane except for a 
true emergency. At that time, father Ostler was not asleep. 
Rather, he was in a reduced state of awareness (from highway 
hypnosis). In that state of reduced awareness, the tail-
lights of the truck "lured" him as a moth to the flame. 
Father Ostler did not realize the truck was parked until too 
late. If the truck had not been illegally parked, father 
Ostler would have, harmlessly, run into a flat adjoining 
field. 
The jury did not hear one iota of Ostler's side of 
the story.^ It was then no wonder that he lost the trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT UNDULY RESTRICTED 
OSTLERfS RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE WHEELER 
ON THE ISSUE OF SEARCHING FOR A PLACE TO URINATE 
A. The Proferred Evidence. 
Ostler's attorney asked Wheeler the following 
question: "How long had you been looking for a place to stop 
and urinate before you actually stopped?" At that point, 
yOstler's cost for experts that the jury never got to 
hear was over $22,000. (R. 1875.) 
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Wheeler's lawyer objected. (Tr. 116|. ) The judge sustained 
the objection. (Tr. 123.) 
An offer of proof was made lout of the hearing of 
the jury. As part of the offer of proof, Wheeler testified 
(outside the presence of the jury) tnat he had been looking 
for approximately 30 minutes for a place to stop and urinate. 
(Tr. 122.) Ostler's attorney then offered Exhibit 4 as a 
part of the offer of proof. Exhibit|4 was a large aerial map 
of the general area. The aerial map showed that within 8-10 
minutes prior to parking, Wheeler parsed the following signs 
and exits: 
1. South Santaquin One Mi^le; 
2. South Santaquin Exit; 
3. South Santaquin Exit; 
4. Santaquin One Mile; 
5. Santaquin Next Right; 
6. Santaquin Exit; 
7. Payson Three Miles; 
8. Payson One Mile. 
The court sustained the objlection and overruled the 
offer of proof. (Tr. 124.) Later iri the trial, Ostler's 
attorney renewed the request to ask hjow lonq Wheeler was 
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looking for a place to urinate. (Tr. 630.) The court again 
sustained the objection and overruled the offer of proof. 
(Tr. 635.) Ostler made a motion for a mistrial on this 
issue. The motion was denied. (Tr. 658.) 
B. Relevance. 
Wheeler was asked how long he was parked at the 
side of the road prior to the accident. Wheeler's response 
was: three minutes at the very most. (Tr. 182-183.) 
However, there was a second version of how long he 
was stopped. Wheeler's driver's log^ showed the accident 
time to be 2:00 a.m. Pacific Standard Time. (Tr. 113.) A 
few hours after the accident, Wheeler gave a tape recorded 
statement answering certain questions about the accident. In 
that statement, he said that he pulled off the highway about 
1:30 or 1:45. (Tr. 191.) Thus, according to the contem-
poraneous documents, he had been parked for 15-30 minutes at 
the time of the accident. -*-•*  
-^Required by the Federal government. 
•'--'•Ostler's prior offer of proof was that Wheeler was 25 
hours over his legal driving time and was, therefore, 
exhausted. (See Tr. 126, above.) The inference is that he 
stopped to sleep--not to urinate. Interestingly, Wheeler 
gave a written statement to the police shortly after the 
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This testimony relates dirlectly to 49 C .F.R. , 
§392.22(b), which states: 
Whenever a vehicle is stopbed upon the 
shoulder of a highway for any cause other 
than necessary traffic stops, the driver 
shall as soon as possible, 
event within 10 minutes pi 
devices rflares or lanterns or tri-:ii 
but in any 
lace the warning 
angles] 
The impeachment theory was 
about looking 30 minutes for a place 
also be lying about how long he was 
classic textbook type of impeachment 
Rules of Evidence: "The credibility 
attacked by any party. . ." (Emphasi 
simple. If Wheeler lied 
to urinate-'-^, he might 
^topped. This was a 
See Rule 607, Utah 
of a witness may be 
b added.) 
For a variety of similar examples, see McCormick, 
Evidence §47 at 111-112 n.19 (3rd Ed 
(See e.g., East Tennessee, 
1984): 
V. & G. R. Co, 
v. Daniels, 91 Ga. 768, 18 
(1893)(witness of alleged 
at crossing accounted for his presence by 
saying he left home to get| some tobacco, 
S.E. 22 
killing of mule 
l^It was conceded that Wheeler ([lid not place the warning 
devices. (Tr. 183-184.) 
^Obviously, Wheeler could have|stopped at any of 
numerous exits to urinate. 
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going to a certain store and getting the 
tobacco on credit, and on his way home he 
saw the accident; adversary offered 
evidence of storekeeper that witness did 
not buy tobacco at that time, held, 
erroneously excluded, "it was indirectly 
material because it contradicted the 
witness as to the train of events which 
led him to be present"); Stephens v. 
People, 19 N.Y. 549, 572 (1859)(murder 
by poisoning with arsenic, defendant's 
witnesses testified the arsenic was 
administered to rats in cellar where 
provisions kept; held proper for state to 
prove by another witness that no 
provisions were kept in cellar, "not 
strictly collateral"); Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. 
Co. v. Matthews, 100 Tex. 63, 93 S.W. 
1068, 1070 (1906) (suit for death of M., 
run over by train; controverted issue was 
whether M. was sober and walking or drunk 
and lying on tracks; A., a hotel clerk, 
crucial witness for plaintiff, said M. 
left hotel early in morning, sober: foul 
play in the death of M. was publicly 
suspected; A. said on cross-examination 
that he had never mentioned M.'s presence 
and departure from hotel except a couple 
of times to one W.; defendant offered 
evidence that A. when he gave above 
testimony by deposition believed W. was 
dead, and produced W. and offered proof 
by him that A. had never told him about 
M.'s presence in the hotel; held 
exclusion of defendant's evidence was 
error. "Evidence therefore which bears 
upon the story of a witness with 
sufficient directness and force to give 
it appreciable value in determining 
whether or not that story is true cannot 
be said to be addressed to an irrelevant 
or collateral issue. . .The effort of the 
defendant was. . .to maintain its 
contention that he had never told any 
one; and that fact being relevant, the 
defendant had the right, we think, to 
meet his apparent effort to break its 
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force."); Hartsfield v. Carolina Cas. 
Ins. Co., 451 P.2d 576 (Alaska 1969)(on 
issue whether insurance cancellation 
notice was sent to defendant by insurer, 
defendant denied receipt and also receipt 
of notices of cancellations of the 
insurance from two other sources. 
Evidence of the mailing by the two latter 
sources was held not collateral.") 
The court's refusal to allow such impeachment was 
clearly prejudicial. Wheeler was the sole eyewitness. 
Without the ability to impeach, defendant Wheeler was 
permitted to stick to his self-servihg story that he had only 
stopped for three minutes to urinate. If the court had 
permitted a searching cross-examination and impeachment, 
Ostler may have convinced the jury that Wheeler had been 
there for 15-30 minutes--not to urinate, but to sleep. 
C. Standard of Review. 
It is true that the trial court has a good deal of 
discretion in regulating the scope of the impeachment. 
However, the court has no power to totally exclude impeach-
ment on a particular subject. See J<fef ferson-Gravois Bank v. 
Cunningham, 674 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. App. 1984). 
Moreover, the trial court simply didn't understand 
the law of impeachment. The trial court supposed that 
impeachment was only possible if theipe was a prior inconsis-
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tent statement. (Tr. 635.) In fact, the prior inconsistent 
statement is just one mode of impeachment. There are several 
other modes of permissible impeachment. West's Handbook of 
Federal Evidence, §607.1. See also Rules 608(a), 608(b), 
609, Utah Rules of Evidence. If the Court bases its 
conclusion on a misunderstanding of the law, discretion is 
abused. Winqert v. W.CA.B. , 468 A.2d 526, 528 (Pa. App. 
1983); Schmidt v. Olsen, 330 N.W.2d 547, 552 (Wis. 1983). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT UNDULY RESTRICTED 
OSTLERfS RIGHT TO IMPEACH WHEELER BY PRIOR BAD ACTS 
As part of the case-in-chief, Ostler proffered 
evidence that Wheeler had violated the 10-Hour Rule, the 15-
Hour Rule, and the 70-Hour Rule. The court rejected the 
evidence. (See Point 1(C), above.) 
Later in the trial, Ostler attempted to offer the 
same evidence, not as affirmative evidence, but as impeach-
ment. (Tr. 198.) See Rule 404(b) and 608(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence^. Specifically, Ostler attempted to show that 
Wheeler had been driving for 25 hours over the legal limit at 
Full text of Rules at Exhibit C. 
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and 363.) Further, that 
le by 25.25 hours; he had 
the time of the accident. (Tr. 126 
Wheeler had violated the 10-hour rulk 
violated the 15-hour rule by 26.75 hours; and he had violated 
the 70-hour rule by 86.25 hours. (Tr. 160 and 363.) 
Although the Court did permit some 1|: 
Ostler was not allowed to ask about 
described above. (Tr. 363-364.) 
The recent case of Huddleston v. United States, 
U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed.2d 771; 56 L.W. 
imited impeachment, 
the specific violations 
4363 (1988) is on point. Huddleston 
selling stolen goods. The government offered evidence that 
was on trial for 
goods on a prior 
bad act was not offered 
\f\; rather, it was offered 
Huddleston had tried to sell stolen 
occasion. The evidence of the prior 
to show that Huddleston was a bad ma 
to show that Huddleston had knowledge that the items were 
stolen. The 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the evidence ot the crime was 
admissible. Specifically, the court said: 
In determining whether theigovernment has 
introduced sufficient evidence to meet 
Rule 104(b), the trial court neither 
weighs credibility nor makes a finding 
that the government has proved the 
conditional fact by a preponderance of 
the evidence. The court simply examines 
all the evidence in the case and decides 
whether the jury could reasonably find 
the conditional fact. . .by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 
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During the trial, Wheeler was asked how long he 
was stopped before the accident, (See Point 11(B), above.) 
Wheeler had a powerful motive to lie. If Wheeler said he was 
parked 15-30 minutes (to sleep—not to urinate), his 
violation of drive time regulations might have come to the 
attention of Federal authorities. However, Wheeler could 
cover-up his exhaustion by saying that he had parked for only 
three minutes to urinate. Therefore, the impeachment 
testimony was proper on the issue of motive pursuant to Rule 
104(b). 
POINT IV 
WHEELER'S LAWYER WAS 
PERMITTED TO MISSTATE THE 
LAW DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT 
In closing argument, Wheeler's attorney was 
permitted to argue that: 
Foreseeability has to do with whether he 
[Wheeler] could perceive, that in his 
drive, Stephen Ostler would at that 
precise moment become inattentive and go 
off the road. . .But in that, the 
foreseeability question is: How was Stan 
Wheeler expected to foresee that at that 
precise time if, as Mr. DeBry said, one 
in a billion chances that it would happen 
right at that particular time. 
(Abstract from Transcript of Trial, at p. 19-20.) 
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Plaintiff made a prompt objection. (Icl. at p. 20-
21.) Specifically, plaintiff objected that Mr. Jeffs had 
misstated the law.15 
Mr. Jeffs' misstatement of law was prejudicial 
The only explanation for this verdict is that the jury was 
confused by Mr. Jeffs' misstatements of the law. The jury 
apparently believed that foreseeabillty related to this 
specific accident. Rather, foreseeapility relates to whether 
accidents of this general nature migjit happen. (See fn. 15, 
above.) 
It is reversible error fori counsel to misstate the 
law in closing argument. Jensen v. jjtah Railway, 72 Utah 
366, 370 P 349, 358 (1927). 
For purposes of arguments ^o the jury, 
counsel, of course, are required to 
accept the charge and yield obedience to 
it, and are not permitted %o argue 
^The correct statement of the law is found in Rees v. 
Albertsons, 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978) \ "What is necessary to 
meet the test of proximate cause is t[hat it be reasonably 
foreseeable, not that the particular 
but that there is a likelihood of an 
general nature." 
accident would occur, 
accident of the same 
In Godesky v. Provo City Ccjrp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 
1984), our Supreme Court approved the following instruction: 
"It is not necessary that the specific injury be foreseen as 
long as a person of ordinary prudence could foresee, as a 
result of his action or inaction, thg possibility of some 
injury. . ." 
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against it. So when counsel in effect 
argued that one of the parents was 
negligent, whether for the purpose of 
showing that such negligence was the sole 
and proximate cause or a concurring cause 
of the injury, he, because of the charge, 
was not within his rights, though the 
argument may have been entirely in good 
faith. We, of course, recognize a wide 
scope and great liberality in arguments 
of causes to the jury. But here the 
court clearly withheld from the jury all 
questions of negligence of the partners 
for any and all purposes. In such case, 
on timely objections, as here made, to 
permit arguments, either directly or 
indirectly, with respect to such 
questions, tends to mislead the jury. 
While the court eliminated some of the 
argument, he ought to have eliminated the 
whole of it, bearing on the subject, and 
erred in not doing so. 
The recent case of Dodson by and through Dodson v. 
Robertson, 710 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. App. 1986) is also in point. 
Dodson involved a child-dart case. During closing argument, 
the defense attorney was permitted to misstate the law. The 
appellate court held that: 
Although regulation of jury argument 
usually rests within the discretion of 
the trial court, such rule does not apply 
where the issue is one of law, as is the 
case here. . .The judgment is reversed 
and the cause remanded for a new trial. 
In the case at bench, trial court did not rule on 
Ostler's objection. Rather, the court stated: 
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The jury is directed to lobk at the 
instructions. They set forth the law in 
that regard. Statement of counsel is to 
be disregarded except as it is accurate. 
(Abstract from Transcript of Trial, at p. 20. 
However, the judge cannot simply stand on the 
sideline. He has a duty to rule, one way or the other. The 
case of Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1977) is on 
point. In Halford, the defense attorney misstated the law in 
closing argument. Plaintiff made a prompt objection. In 
response to the objection, the judge 
overrule the objection. Rather, the 
The jury is instructed that you are to 
read the instructions of t 
law of this case is given 
written instructions which 
to the jury room. 
did not sustain or 
judge responded: 
i^e court. The 
j:o you in the 
you will take 
Of course, the judge's response in Halford is 
almost identical to the court's response in this case. (See 
above.) The appellate court ruled that, 
The trial court did not correct the 
statement of defendant's counsel, nor did 
counsel himself do so. The terse 
misstatement could have been tersely 
corrected. 
The Utah Supreme Court has 
exact point in the case of State v. ghickles, 
, 85 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 3 (Utah 1988). Shickles was a 
criminal trial. At closing argument, 
recently spoken to this 
P.2d 
the prosecutor made 
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certain misstatements of law. the defense objected, 
whereupon the prosecutor partially withdrew his erroneous 
statements. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The trial judge did nothing to dispel the 
erroneous impression created; indeed, the 
trial judge did not even rule on the 
objection. 
if ic ic ie 
Clearly, defendant was entitled to have 
the trial court rule on his objections, 
and at the least, both should have been 
sustained. In addition the prosecutor's 
erroneous statements should have been 
stricken. 
• * • * 
Given the posture of the case when the 
statement was made, at the end of the 
trial during closing arguments and the 
misleading impact that the statement may 
well have had on the jury, the error in 
this case was clearly prejudicial. 
Actually, the case at Bar is stronger than 
Shickles. In Shickles, the prosecutor had actually withdrawn 
one of the offensive statements. In the case at bench, the 
offensive statement remained with the jury. 
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POINT V 
IN CLOSING ARGUMENT, WHEELER'S 
LAWYER MADE IMPROPER STATEMENTS 
ABOUT WHO WOULD PAY ANY JUDGMENT J^
In closing argument, Wheeler's attorney said: 
This case is not to decide! how much (sic) 
injuries Ralph has. . .This case is to 
decide whether Wheeler, F & R Roe and 
Albina are to pay for the fLnjuries to 
Ralph. . . 
(Abstract from Transcript of Trial, ^t p. 23.) Plaintiff 
made a prompt objection. 
Such arguments are highly jlmproper. See Hill v. 
Cloward, 377 P.2d 186, 14 Ut.2d 55 (ibtah 1962); Priel v. 
R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 65 (N.D. 1986); and, Tomeo v. 
Northern Valley Swim Club, 493 A.2d 544 (N.J. App. 1985). In 
Priel, supra, the defendant's counsel argued in closing that: 
We are talking about money!that my client 
will have to pay out of his own pocket. 
In the face of that argument, the Supreme Court 
held that: 
In our view, counsel's statement implying 
that his client was not insured was an 
improper argument requiring reversal and 
a new trial. 
In Tomeo, supra, the defen4ant's counsel argued in 
closing that: 
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. . .[W]hen someone comes up to anyone 
and says, "I've been injured and I want 
you (sic) money. I want your posses-
sions. I want your house," they must 
back up the allegations to establish 
that. 
• * * * 
She's seeking money damages from my 
client. That's what this case is all 
about. 
In response to this argument, the appellate court 
held that such remarks constituted reversible error. 
[W]e think the transgression of ordinary 
rules of fair play was so flagrant that 
on the basis of plain error another day 
in court should be given to the probable 
victims of their adversary's disin-
genuousness. 
In like manner, Wheeler's comments were prejudicial 
and untrue. Any recovery would come from the insurance 
carrier—not from the individuals personally. 
POINT VI 
UPON REMAND, OSTLER 
SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO AMEND HIS 
COMPLAINT TO CLAIM PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Prior to trial, Ostler made a motion to add a claim 
for punitive damages. (R. 1325-1327.) The motion was 
denied. (Tr. 37.) 
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Ostler's theory for punitive damages was that 
Wheeler had driven until he was exhausted. Specifically, he 
was 25.25 hours over the 10-hour rule; 26.75 hours over the 
15-hour rule; and 86.25 hours over tl 
160.) These regulations were specif 
exhausted drivers off the road. (Tr 
In the case of Biswell v, 
16 he 70-hour rule.±D (Tr, 
Really passed to get 
159.) 
fruncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Ut, 
App. 1987), this court said: 
. . .[W]e conclude that thte standard for 
an award of punitive damages in cases 
other than false imprisonment in Utah is 
"actual malice/malice in fact" or "legal 
malice," i.e., conduct that manifests a 
reckless disregard or indifference to the 
rights and safety of other?. 
Id 
conclude that Wheeler 
regulations and driving 
at p. 84. 
In this case, a jury might| 
acted recklessly by breaking Federal 
in an exhausted condition. Indeed, the jury may infer that 
he really stopped to sleep--not to urinate. Moreover, there 
is testimony that a fatigued driver is equally as dangerous 
as a drunk driver. (Tr. 280.) 
The case of Torres v. North American Van Lines, 658 
P.2d 835 (Ariz. App. 1982) is on poirtt. In Torres, a truck 
-'-"Wheeler's employer, Albina, hdtd or should have had 
actual knowledge of the violation. (R. 1330.) 
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stuck the rear of a parked vehicle. Expert witnesses 
testified that the accident was caused by driver fatigue. In 
upholding an award of punitive damages, the court said there 
was evidence indicating that: 
. . .[H]e was attempting to avoid the 70-
hour rule17. As noted above, the avowed 
purpose of the Federal regulations as 70 
hours of service of drivers is to protect 
the public travelling on the high-
ways. . .A jury could logically conclude 
that this manifested a wanton disregard 
of the safety of others. . . 
POINT VI 
THE JURY WAS INCORRECTLY 
INSTRUCTED ON WHEELERrS DUTY 
TO SET OUT FLARES OR TRIANGLES 
A. Evidentiary Background. 
Wheeler admitted that he did not set out flares or 
reflective triangles after he stopped. (Tr. 183-184.) 
Ostler adduced evidence that the accident happened at 3:00 
a.m. Local Time. Ostler also introduced a statement made a 
few hours from the accident in which Wheeler stated he had 
been parked since 1:30 or 1:45 Pacific Standard Time (2:30 or 
2:45 a.m. Mountain Standard Time). (Tr. 191.) Thus, Ostler 
had evidence that Wheeler was stopped on the shoulder from 15 
The same rule at issue in this case. 
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to 30 minutes. At trial, Wheeler c 
claimed that he had only been stoppeji 
(Tr. 182.) (Compare Point II, above|. ) 
hanged his story and 
for three minutes , 
B, Applicable Law, 
Wheeler was driving a truck in interstate commerce, 
Thus, Wheeler's conduct was governed 
regulations. See generally, 49 C.F.R. §322. These regula 
by a number of federal 
tions for interstate truck drivers ppe-empt any lesser state 
standard: 
However, if a regulation of the Federal 
Highway Administration imposes a higher 
standard of care than that!law [i.e., 
state or local law], the Federal Highway 
Administration regulation ipust be 
complied with. 
49 C.F.R. §392,2 (1970). Wheeler's duty to set out flares or 
reflective triangles was governed by I.e.C. regulations. 
Thurston v. Ballou, 505 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. App. 1987). 49 
C.F.R. §392.22(b) states: 
[W]henever a vehicle is stepped upon the 
shoulder of a highway fromjany cause 
other than necessary traffic stops, the 
driver shall as soon as possible, but in 
any event within 10 minutes, place 
warning devices [flares or|reflective 
triangles]. 
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Thus, Wheeler had a duty to set out flares or reflective 
triangles "as soon as possible." The outside limit of "as 
soon as possible" is set by regulation at 10 minutes. 
C. Instruction to the Jury. 
In accordance with 49 C.F.R. §322.22(b), Ostler 
requested a jury instruction that: 
Federal regulations require that after 
stopping on the shoulder, Wheeler placed 
[flares or triangles] behind his truck as 
soon as possible, but in any event within 
10 minutes. 
* • * • • * • • * • 
However, if you find that Wheeler was 
parked for less than 10 minutes, it is 
for you to determine whether or not 
Wheeler set out the flares or triangles 
as soon as possible. 
(R. 1618.) 
The trial court's instruction was largely the same 
but contained an important variance: 
However, if you find that defendant 
Wheeler was parked for less than 10 
minutes, it is for you to determine 
whether or not Wheeler should neverthe-
less have set out the flares or triangles 
under the existing circumstances. 
(R. 1670 (emphasis added).) Ostler's counsel objected to the 
error. (Tr. 951-952; 956.) 
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The error is obvious. By Jfederal law, Wheeler 
to do so, "as soon as 
Is jury was whether he did 
should have to set out flares or trijangles "as soon as 
possible." The jury was instead instructed to determine 
whether Wheeler should have set themj out at all, "under the 
existing circumstances." But, federal law had already 
answered the question of whether Whepler should have set out 
flares. The answer was that he had 
possible." The only question for tht 
it "as soon as possible." 
The trial court's instruction, in effect, was to 
determine whether a reasonable persoin "under the existing 
circumstances" would have set out flares. This allowed the 
jury the leeway to conclude that because Wheeler had only 
stopped for a few minutes, he didn't! really, need to use 
flares or triangles, even though he could have. In summary, 
the trial court asked the jury "should" Wheeler use flares or 
triangles; federal law asks "did" hel 
The instruction was erroneous. 
use flares or triannlps. 
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D. The Erroneous Instruction was Prejudicial. 
An incorrect statement of a defendant's duty is 
generally prejudicial error. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. v. 
Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978); compare, Gillespie v. 
S.U.S.C., 669 P.2d 861 (Utah 1983)(no prejudice to plaintiff 
where instruction held defendant to erroneously high standard 
of care). Here, the trial court held Wheeler to an er-
roneously low standard of conduct. 
Further, a jury instruction on a defendant's duty 
which is inconsistent or contradictory is reversible error. 
Morrison v. Perry, 140 P.2d 772, 104 Utah 151 (1943). The 
fact that one of the standards given to the jury is correct 
does not prevent reversible error if the other standard given 
is incorrect. Renner v. Nestor, 656 P.2d 553 (Wash. App. 
1983); Hall v. Cooper, 691 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. App. 1985); Veliz 
v. American Hosp., Inc., 414 So.2d 226 (Fla. App. 1982); 
Alamo v. Roger, 448 A.2d 207 (Conn. 1982); Angus v. Liberty 
Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 457 So.2d 971 (Ala. 1984). 
Thus, the fact that the first paragraph of the 
trial court's instruction was correct does not remove error; 
instead, it makes the instruction even more confusing by 
setting out two materially different standards of care. 
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POINT VIII 
THERE WAS NO VOIR DIRE 
TO UNCOVER BIAS RELATED TO TORT REFORM PUBLICITY 
insurer (Farmers 
Ostler submitted evidence >^f a recent advertising 
campaign (by insurance companies) designed to scare the 
public about jury awards. (R. 1255-1273.) Indeed, Ostler 
submitted a letter sent by Wheeler's 
Insurance Group) to all Utah insureds several days before 
trial. (R. 1271.) This letter titled, "You Pay for 
Plaintiff's Lawyers
 f" told jurors that if they gave a verdict 
for a plaintiff, they (jurors) would pay for it. The Court 
ruled on Ostler's voir dire in chambers and excluded certain 
SUFFICIENT 
questions prepared by Ostler. (Tr. 
Ostler should have been al 
determine juror attitudes to this advertising campaign and 
specifically, to determine if any jurors received Farmers' 
mailing. State v. Nichols, 734 P.2djl70 (Mont. 1987) at 173: 
Voir dire must be used to determine which 
jurors have been so affected by pretrial 
publicity, [that] they wou 
render a fair verdict. 
4-22.) 
owed to use voir dire to 
d be unable to 
U.S. v. Whitt, 718 F.2d 1494 (10th Cir. 1983) at 1497: 
Where there is the possibility or 
likelihood that potential jurors have 
been exposed to prejudicial publicity, 
they must be questioned with special care 
so as to insure that such publicity did 
not result in bias. 
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State v. Greenawalt, 624 P.2d 828 (Ariz. 1981) at 841: 
An examination of the jurors, through 
voir dire process, is an effective means 
by which to determine the effects or 
influence of pretrial publicity on the 
jurors. 
Without effective voir dire regarding the insurance 
industry's media blitz, there was no way for Ostler to 
intelligently determine whether jurors should have been 
excused for cause; nor was counsel able to intelligently 
exercise peremptory challenges for potential bias. This was 
error. Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979); King v. 
Westlake 572 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1978). See also, Johnson v. 
Hansen, 389 P.2d 330 (Or. 1964); Lowell v. Daly, 169 A.2d 888 
(Conn. 1961). 
Some courts disallow such voir dire where the / 
questions mention insurance. Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal.Rptr. 
494 (App. 1977); Maness v. Bullins, 198 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. App. 
1973). However, Ostler's voir dire questions 24-31, 33, and 
36 (R. 1421-1423) have been carefully drafted to avoid using 
the word insurance, or to avoid suggesting that there is in-
surance. Questions 32(e), 34, 35 and 37 (R. 241) mention 
insurance in a way that does not suggest that defendant has 
insurance, but focus on the jurors' attitude toward the 
insurance industry, and the ability to remain fair. 
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Ralph Ostler's use of voir dire is further 
supported by Utah Rule of Evidence, 411. Rule 411 allows 
evidence of insurance, inter alia, to show "bias or prejudice 
of a witness."1^ If insurance is admissible to test the bias 
of a witness, it should be admissible to test the bias of a 
juror. Furthermore, the voir dire questions only probed 
juror bias toward insurance generally, and made no implica-
tion that Wheeler was in fact insured. 
The court did ask question 13 (R. 241) which was 
very broad and basically asked the jurors if they felt they 
were impartial. While this is helpful, a juror's own 
assessment of impartiality is insufficient to protect against 
unintentional or unconscious bias. ^tate v. Ball, 685 P.2d 
1055 (Utah 1984)(juror's statement of impartiality not 
conclusive). Also, Darbin v. Nourse, 774 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 
1981)(general inquiry of juror prejudice insufficient to 
reveal unconscious or unacknowledged bias). People who are 
most biased are at least likely to admit any bias. 
it5Rule 411. Liability Insurance: "Evidence that a 
person was or was not insured against liability is not 
admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or 
otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the 
exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when 
offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, 
ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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It is highly questionable whether a juror who has 
read and believed this advertising can be impartial and 
unbiased, "[E]ven a single exposure to one of those ads can 
dramatically lower the amount of award a juror is willing to 
give." Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65 
A.B.A.J. 68, 69 (Jan. 1979). Furthermore, Ostler could have 
used a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror who may have 
been exposed to the tort reform campaign. The trial court's 
restrictive voir dire prevented Ostler from identifying 
jurors who may have ben affected consciously or subconscious-
ly by tort reform propaganda. This left a jury able to 
perform a one-time "tort reform" on Ostler's case. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING OSTLERrS 
VIDEOTAPE DEMONSTRATION 
A. Background. 
Ostler claimed that "but for" Wheeler's negligence 
in parking his semi-truck on the shoulder of 1-15, no 
accident would have occurred. The jury may have concluded 
that, even if Wheeler had not been parked in Ostler's path, 
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Ostler would have driven off the road and overturned causing 
serious injury to Ralph in any eventj 
Shupe, a police officer and accident 
analyze this question. Wheeler made 
exclude Shupe's reconstruction videojtape. (R. 968.) The 
JShupe's videotape was 
is at R. 997. In light 
trial court granted the motion, and 
excluded. (R. 1197.) The videotape 
of the court's ruling, Ostler did no[t call Shupe, whose 
testimony would largely have involve^ the evidence in the 
videotape. 
Ostler hired Val 
reconstructionist, to 
a motion in limine to 
B. Val Shupe's Opinion on Causatiofi, 
Val Shupe gave an expert obinion that if Wheeler's 
truck were not parked on the side of 
probably not have rolled his truck. 
the road, Ostler would 
QUESTION (BY MR. JEFFS) MV question is, 
without knowing, without being a 
psychologist, do you have enough factors 
that you could have said with any degree 
of certainty what would have happened if 
the truck had not been there? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I din. 
QUESTION (BY MR. JEFFS) What? 
ANSWER: It would be my opinion that he 
probably would have been slightly off the 
shoulder and back on. There's probably 
one of three scenarios or four scenarios 
he could have taken. He would have went 
off the shoulder, or slightly off and 
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came back on in his own lane. He would 
have went out into the right hand as we 
demonstrated in the video, at which time 
we know he wouldn't have rolled over, but 
we did it on a video. He could have made 
a jerking motion, corrected, and came 
back into the inside lane, or he could 
have made a jerking motion and gone 
straight on over. 
But there's no indication based on my 
opinion, based on the information that I 
have, that he would have rolled the 
vehicle, because I'm not a psychologist, 
I don't know whether that's going to 
happen or not. And so I think he would 
have probably taken one of the other 
three scenarios. 
(Val Shupe Depo., p. 48-50.) 
C. Val Shupefs Qualifications. 
Mr. Shupe is a police officer of 14 years duration. 
(Id. p. 3.) He has had training for accident reconstruction 
from the Northwest Traffic Institute in Illinois on two 
separate occasions (Ld., p. 5), as well as several courses 
at two California community colleges (Rl. , p. 6). Mr. Shupe 
is an instructor with the Utah Peace Officer's Standards and 
Training (I_d. , p. 4), and an accident reconstruction 
instructor at the California Community College in Sacramento, 
California (Id.., p. 8). 
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D. Legal Standard. 
The determination of a tri&l court that an 
experiment is substantially similar T:O the subject of the 
occurrence is reviewed de novo: 
Whether substantial similarity does exist 
is a question which is reviewable by the 
appellate courts in the sai^ e manner as is 
any other question of law. 
Short v. G.M.C. , 320 S.E.2d 19, 20 (ik.C. App. 1984). The 
question of substantial similarity i^ one of conditional 
relevance under 104(b). If the evidence before the trial 
court would support a jury finding of substantial similarity, 
the evidence is admissible for the jury to weigh. Huddleston 
v. U.S. , U.S. , 10^ 1 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 
771 (1988). 
E c Legal Analysis. 
1. The Videotape Was Admissibjj 
ve aid to Shupe's expert 
Purposes. 
The videotape re-creation by Shupe was admissible 
at a minimum, simply as an illustrati^ 
testimony. Witnesses are customarily allowed to illustrate 
their testimony by using charts or diagrams. The only 
foundation is whether the visual aid will assist the witness 
in explaining his testimony. Zurzolol v. GMC, 69 F.R.D. 469 
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e for Illustrative 
(E.D. Pa. 1975). Of course, theoretically the visual aid may 
be excluded under 403(b) considerations. However, Wheeler 
did not identify any unfair prejudice under Rule 403(b) from 
the videotape. 
Videotapes and films offered for illustrative 
purposes and not as a re-enactment of the accident are 
generally admitted. Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 
Inc., 398 A.2d 490 (Md. App. 1979) (helpful to jury to 
receive visual support for expert's opinion); Szeliga v. GMC, 
728 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1984) (aid to jury to understand 
opinion of defendant's expert; differences between videotape 
and actual event go to weight, not admissibility); Millers 
National Insurance Co. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 
93 (10th Cir. 1958) (lack of similarity of movie to actual 
event was not important because movie was offered simply as 
illustrative aid to tedious "professorial" testimony of 
experts). Indeed, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
admit the videotape as an illustrative aid. Young v. IJL1. 
Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 618 F.2d 332 (3rd Cir. 1980) (abuse of 
discretion to refuse to allow movie offered to illustrate 
plaintiff's theory of the case). 
Wheeler correctly conceded that a film or videotape 
of a re-enactment of an accident under substantially similar 
conditions is admissible. However, apart from any questions 
52 
of substantial similarity, the vi 
more limited purpose as an illustrat 
would have been appropriate for the 
jury that the videotape was for illu 
and not as substantive evidence. Z 
deottape was admissible for a 
ive aid. Of course, it 
Court to instruct the 
ptrative purposes only 
zolo v. GMC, supra; ur 
Millers National Insurance Co. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 
supra 
2. The Demonstration was)Proper Substantive 
Evidence. 
An experiment done under substantially similar 
v. Havens, 242 Cal.Rptr, conditions is admissible. DiRosario 
423 (App. 1987). 
The Shupe videotape was supported by Mr. Shupe's 
description of the substantial similarities between the 
accident and the re-creation. The p&th of the pick up used 
in the film to represent the Ostler vehicle followed the 
same path as the Ostler vehicle. (sliupe Affidavit, R. 1027, 
para. 11.) A sleeping bag containing sand bags weighing the 
same as Ralph was placed in the bed <t>f the pick up. (R. 
1029, para. 8.) Shupe calculated th& most probable speed of 
the Ostler pick up at 48 miles per hour (R. 1029, para. 7). 
The truck used in the videotape was then driven at 4 8 miles 
per hour as verified by Shupe's radaip gun (R. 1030, para. 
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11). The vehicles used in the re-creation approximate as 
nearly as possible the actual vehicles involved. (R. 1029, 
para. 8.) Shupe summarized the similarities as follows: 
All physical conditions during the 
videotape demonstration were as nearly 
identical to those existing at the time 
of the accident, with the exception that 
the demonstration occurred during 
daylight hours, whereas the accident 
occurred at night. 
(R. 1030, at para. 8.) 
Wheeler's objection listed a number of "dis-
similarity." These all revolved around a single objection: 
that the stunt driver who drove the pick up used in the video 
may not have reacted in the same way that Stephen Ostler 
might have reacted at the time of the accident. Shupe agreed 
that only God knows exactly how Ostler would have reacted. 
(Shupe depo., p. 54.) However, the videotape never purported 
to show with absolute certitude what Ostler would have done. 
It did accurately show the scenario which was most probable 
according to Ralph's expert, Val Shupe. The fact that there 
were possible, but unlikely, differences in the reaction of 
Stephen Ostler and the stunt driver went to weight, not 
admissibility. 
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Precise reproduction of circumstances is 
not required, particularly! where any 
differences are explainable by an expert 
witness. 
Short v. GMC, supra, 320 S.E.2d, at J2 0. If Wheeler's 
objection was correct, then no one cpuld ever re-create an 
auto accident, because no one can ever say for sure that the 
stunt driver reacts the same as the jreal driver. Of course, 
courts have often admitted auto accident reconstruction 
despite this obvious lack of precisejsimilarity. Wheeler's 
objections were like those in DiRosario v. Havens, supra. 
The DiRosario court found that the lack of precise similarity 
was no reason to exclude the videotape reconstruction. See 
also Zoller v. Winters, 712 P.2d 525l(Idaho 1985). 
POINT X 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION ON 
INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAU$E WAS INCORRECT £ 
The Court's Instruction No J 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 7 If an 
from two distinct causes, consideration 
then must be given to the question 
whether the causal connection between the 
conduct of the party responsible for the 
first cause and the injury 
the intervention of a new, 
cause. 
27 reads as follows: 
injury arises 
was broken by 
indeoendent 
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If so, the person responsible for 
the first cause would not be liable for 
the injury. If, however, the intervening 
cause or the likelihood of an occurrence 
of the same general nature was foreseen 
or should reasonably have been foreseen 
by the person responsible for the first 
cause, then such person's conduct would 
be the proximate cause of the injury, 
notwithstanding the intervening cause, 
and he would be liable therefor. 
Thus, if you find the collision of 
the vehicle driven by Stephen Ostler with 
a tractor-trailer of Albina Transfer 
Company, Inc., parked on the shoulder of 
the highway, or the likelihood of an 
occurrence of the same general nature, 
was within the natural and continuous 
sequence of events which might reasonably 
be foreseen to follow the actions of 
Stanley Wheeler, then you must find that 
the actions of Stanley Wheeler were a 
concurring proximate cause of the 
collision, even thought the later 
negligent act of Stephen Ostler co-
operated to cause the accident. 
But if the actions of Stephen Ostler 
in causing the collision were of such 
character as not reasonably to be 
foreseen in the natural and continuous 
sequence of events started by Stanley 
Wheeler, then the acts of Stephen Ostler 
are the independent intervening cause 
and, therefore, the sole proximate cause 
of the injury. 
Ostler objected on various grounds. (Tr. 953-954.) 
The major flaw in Instruction No. 27 is that the 
term intervening independent cause (as introduced in the 
first paragraph of Instruction No. 25) is not defined for the 
jury. The Restatement Torts,2d includes 13 sections defining 
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that concept. (See Restatement §440^453.) Of course, all of 
those sections are not relevant to this case; however, §447 
is relevant. (For complete discussion of §447, see pages 13-
15, above.) Other sections are also relevant. (See Point 
XI, below.) In the absence of a faijf definition, the jury 
was left to flounder. 
Second, Instruction No. 25|assumes that "foreseea-
bility" is the only test which is important in determining 
causation in this case. That is simply wrong. A textual 
description would be as follows: 
The Restatement, Torts,2d Contains a 
detailed, definitional discussion of an 
intervening force—which by its active 
operation, may or may not prevent an 
actor's antecedent negligence from being 
a "legal" cause in bringing about harm to 
another person. . .The Restatement, 
Torts,2d, stresses some six elements as 
the important considerations in determin-
ing whether an intervening force is a 
superceding cause of harm to another, 
thus breaking the chain of causation. 
Speiser, The American Law of Torts, Vol. 3, §11.9 (1983) 
(emphasis added). 
Third, the instruction says 
of Stephen Ostler in causing the coll) 
reasonably to be foreseen. . . ",. the 
broken. This is saying that the precj 
of harm or accident ("the actions of 
that, "if the actions 
ision were. . .not 
chain of causation was 
ise or specific manner 
Stephen Ostler") 
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must be foreseeable. Instead, only a generalized risk of 
harm need be foreseeable; the specific sequence of events 
need not be foreseeable. Rees v. Albertsons, supra.; 
Restatement of Torts,2d §435, "Foreseeability of Harm or Its 
Manner of Occurrence." 
Finally, Instruction No. 25 is hopelessly confus-
ing. It is likely that the judges of this Court will have to 
read that instruction two, three or four times to understand 
it. It is simply impossible for a lay person without three 
years of law school to have any idea of the meaning of that 
language. 
The object of jury instructions is to 
enlighten the jury on their problems. 
Instructions should fit the facts shown, 
making them as clear in meaning and 
concise as possible in lay people's 
language without belaboring definitions. 
Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse Co., 16 Ut.2d 186, 398 P.2d 24 
(1965). When instructions tend to confuse the jury, reversal 
is proper. Burton v. Fisher Controls, 713 P.2d 1137, on 
rehearing 723 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1986). 
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POINT XI 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE I DIRECTED A 
VERDICT AGAINST WHEELER ON CAUSATION 
A. Procedural Background. 
The trial court directed aI verdict that Wheeler was 
negligent as a matter of law in parking on the side of the 
freeway. At the close of plaintiff'^ evidence, Ostler moved 
for a directed verdict on causation, 
court denied the motion. 
(Tr. 771. ) The trial 
B. Legal Standard. 
A directed verdict is appropriate if reasonable 
minds cannot differ that Wheeler's negligence is parking on 
the shoulder of the freeway was a proximate cause of Ostler's 
injuries. Mqt. Comm. v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 
(Utah 1982) . 
Legal Analysis 
Proximate cause limits Whe^l 
risks of foreseeable harm created by 
er's liability to those 
his negligent parking: 
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. . .the effort of the courts has been, 
in the development of this doctrine of 
proximate causation, to confine the 
liability of a negligent actor to those 
harmful consequences which result from 
the operation of the risk, or of a risk, 
the foreseeability of which rendered the 
defendant's conduct negligent. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marshall, 222 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 
1955) . 
By ruling that Wheeler was negligent, the trial 
court implicitly found that Wheeler's parking on the freeway 
shoulder created an unreasonable risk of: (1) causing harm 
to a class of persons of which Ostler was a member and (2) 
subjecting Ostler to the hazard from which Ostler's injury 
resulted. Restatement of Torts,2d §281(b), and comment 
thereto. Stated another way, the trial court implicitly 
found that Wheeler's negligent parking created an unrea-
sonable risk of foreseeable harm to passengers in passing 
cars (such as Ralph). 
Of course, the realization of the risk of harm 
actually came about through the negligent act of Stephen 
Ostler straying from the travelled lane into the shoulder. 
But, if Wheeler's negligence in parking created a hazard of 
an accident with a negligent passing motorist, then he is 
still liable. The negligently created risk of an accident 
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with another negligent motorist is t|ie act that makes Wheeler 
negligent in the first place: 
Sec. 449. Tortious or Criminal Acts of 
the Probability 
Actor's Conduct 
If the likelihood that a third person may 
act in a particular manner is the hazard 
or one of the hazards which makes the 
actor negligent, such an act whether 
innocent, negligent, intentionally 
tortious, or criminal does 
the actor from being liabl^ for harm 
caused thereby. 
of Which Makes 
Negligent 
not prevent 
Restatement of Torts,2d §449. The reporter's comment to this 
section explains further: 
b. The happening of the v^ry event the 
likelihood of which makes the actor's 
conduct negligent and so subjects the 
actor to liability cannot relieve him 
from liability. The duty to refrain from 
the act committed or to do the act 
omitted is imposed to protect the other 
from this very danger. To deny recovery 
because the other's exposure to the very 
risk from which it was the purpose of the 
duty to protect him resulted in harm to 
hTm, would be to deprive the other of all 
protection and to make the |duty a 
nullity. 
(I_d. , comment (b) (emphasis added.)) The Utah Legislature 
created a statutory duty not to park 
high-speed freeway. The trial court 
as a matter of law, that Wheeler's st| 
breached) extended to protect innocen 
because a negligent driver strayed in| 
on the shoulder of a 
should have determined, 
atutory duty (which he 
t passengers injured 
to the shoulder. When 
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the trial court submitted the proximate cause question to the 
jury, it allowed the jury "to make the statutory duty a 
nullity." (Id.) 
The fact that reasonable minds could not differ on 
proximate cause is illustrated by the following question: 
What risks of harm (other than accidents with passing 
motorists) could make Wheeler's parking negligent? None are 
apparent. Certainly, the emergency lane was not for picnics 
or taking in a scenic view. Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 267 
So.2d 714 (La. 1972)("this statute [parking on highway] is 
designed to protect against the risk that a driver, whether 
cautious or inattentive would collide with a stationary 
vehicle.") The only foreseeable harm threatened by Wheeler's 
negligence was that of an accident with a passing motorist. 
Since that is exactly what happened, a reasonable jury-1-^  must 
find proximate causation. 
Casting the analysis in the slightly different 
terms of intervening force and superseding cause leads to the 
same result. If Wheeler's negligent parking created a risk 
of harm to negligent passing motorists, Wheeler is still 
liable: 
iyOstler believes the jury was composed of reasonable 
laymen who misunderstood proximate causation. 
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Sec. 442A. Intervening Force Risked by 
Actors Conduct. 
Where the negligent conduct of the actor 
creates or increases the foreseeable risk 
of harm through the intervention of 
another force, and is a substantial 
factor in causing the harmj such 
intervention is not a superseding cause. 
b. Where the negligence off the actor has 
created the risk of harm to another 
because of the likelihood of such 
intervention, the actor is not relieved 
of responsibility merely because the risk 
which he has created has in fact been 
fulfilled. The same is triie where there 
is already some existing risk or 
possibility of the intervention, but the 
negligence of the actor had increased 
the risk of such intervention, or of harm 
if it occurs. 
Restatement of Torts,2d §442A and comment b thereto (emphasis 
added). The only way Wheeler could be excused from liability 
is if Stephen Ostler's conduct was intentional and not within 
the scope of the risk of harm created] by Wheeler's negli-
gence: 
Sec. 442B. Intervening Force Causing 
Same Harm as That Risked by Actor's 
Conduct. 
Where the negligent conduct of the actor 
creates or increases the risk of a 
particular harm and is a substantial 
factor in causing that' harm, the fact 
that the harm is brought about through 
the intervention of another force does 
not relieve the actor of liability, 
except where the harm is intentionally 
caused by a third person and is not 
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within the scope of the risk created by 
the actor's conduct. 
There was no jury question that Stephen Ostler 
acted intentionally; nor was his conduct outside the risk of 
foreseeable harm created by Wheeler's parking. Thus, as a 
matter of law, Stephen Ostler's negligence was not an 
intervening cause. 
Ostler submitted legislative history that indicated 
the purpose of the statute prohibiting parking on freeways 
was passed to prevent accidents between parked cars and 
passing motorists. Utah's statute (Utah Code Ann. §41-6-
103(e)) was taken verbatim from the Uniform Vehicle Code §11-
1003 drafted by the National Committee on Uniform Traffic 
Laws and Ordinances• The Subcommittee Report recommending 
the particular language used in Utah's statute states: 
Several Subcommittee members suggested 
that a no stopping rule will not be 
obeyed because people will continue to 
stop to rest (as they are advised by many 
signs to do), to change drivers, to read 
maps, to check equipment, to eat, etc. A 
majority of the Subcommittee felt, that 
such stops should be made only in rest 
areas and not on the controlled-access 
highway where such stopping is very 
hazardous. 
(R. 1343.)20 
Awhile contained in the record, the legislative history 
is a legislative fact, not an adjudicative fact, and thus not 
formally a matter of evidence. 
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Ostler also proferred two government studies, one 
by California and one by Maryland. These studies illustrate 
the hazard that semi-trucks parked on the side of the freeway 
pose to passing motorists. The Maryland study concluded: 
Parked truck accidents are much more 
severe than other parked vehicle 
accidents. The probability of being 
involved in a fatal parked 
is ten times greater on 55 
compared to non 55 MPH highways. 
ac Because parked truck 
much more severe than othejt 
vehicle accidents, some type 
should be taken to get the 
shoulders of the highways, 
that passengers and operators 
have a much better chance 
clear recovery area is pro^ J 
tractor trailers on shoulders of our high 
speed highways introduce unnecessary 
obstacles in the clear recovery area. It 
truck accident 
MPH highways 
cidents are 
parked 
of action 
trucks off the 
It is obvious 
of vehicles 
f survival if 
>ided. Parked 
should be noted that finding a place of 
tired and probably exhausted truck 
drivers to park their trucks is a 
problem. However, due to severity of 
parked truck accidents, the trucks should 
not be allowed to park on the shoulders 
of 55 MPH highways. 
(R. 1359)(emphasis added). 
The California study reached a similar conclusion: 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 
Perhaps the most significant factor 
affecting the increase in the number of 
fatal roadside rear end accidents on 
California freeways is the [number of 
trucks involved. . . 
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In 1963, General Motors made a study on 
the "Relation of Cross-Section Design and 
Highway Safety" in which it produced a 
"hazard" curve of GM Proving Ground 
accidents. These "accidents" occurred 
under ideal conditions and in the hands 
of carefully trained and supervised 
drivers. The study showed that 80 
percent of the cars deviated less than 33 
feet from the edge of the road and 40 
percent deviated less than 10 feet. 
Approximately 85 percent of the vehicles 
involved in a fatal roadside rear end 
accident in California in 1983 and 1984 
deviated less than 10 feet from the edge 
of the traveled way before striking 
another vehicle parked on the shoulder or 
median. Over 40 percent of the vehicles 
struck in these roadside accidents in 
1984 were parked for non-emergency 
reasons. For maximum safety, it is 
imperative that the roadside remain clear 
of obstacles so that a driver has ample 
opportunity to regain control and avoid 
serious difficulties. 
* * * * 
Truck drivers, in particular, need to be 
aware of the danger of stopping or 
parking on freeway shoulders, especially 
for non-emergencies such as checking 
loads, tires and air lines, reading maps, 
and sleeping. Trucking organizations 
should notify members of the danger of 
parking on the shoulders and remind 
truckers to plan ahead for coffee breaks, 
sleeping arrangements and vehicle 
maintenance. 
(R. 1365-1368)(emphasis added).) The bottom line (literally) 
to the California study is that: "Ultimately, if the parked 
vehicle had not been there, an accident might not have 
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occurred." (id. at 1368. J^ 1 The te^or of all three of these 
reports is that roadside parking by jtruckers is extremely 
dangerous to passing motorists. As k matter of law and 
policy, the courts should extend the protection of the "no 
parking" statute to injured passengers such as Ralph. 
CONCLUSION 
Ostler seeks a directed vetdict against Wheeler on 
the issue of proximate cause. In the alternative, Ostler 
seeks a new trial at which the trial court will correctly 
admit evidence, permit proper impeachment, and correctly 
instruct the jury on proximate cause! If the case is 
remanded for a new trial, Ostler shoijild be permitted to add a 
claim for punitive damages. 
DATED this / h day of /y.[- -ry^. : , 1988 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By: 
r 
^Government reports are also legislative facts which a 
court can freely resort to for determining questions of law 
and policy. Ostler suggested that the trial court take 
judicial notice of these reports; alternatively, Ostler 
proferred Slade Hulbert to lay the foundation for these 
documents' authenticity. (R. 1343.) The trial court did ' 
not rule on either request, but apparently treated them as 
legislative facts. See O'Hanlon v. Hartford Ace. & Indent. 
Co., 457 F.Supp. 961 (D. Del. 1978); cf. Barber v. Ponti, 772 
F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1985)(en banc)(judicial notice taken by 
appellate court of official government statistics). 
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EXHIBIT A 
In An Emergency 
P\nrn Warning Devices 
EXHIBIT B 
•3 
ffirmed in all 
ie is remanded 
ioner may act 
ent with both 
Services and 
aperiy noticed 
THOMPSON, 
RUST FUND, 
State Farm 
Appellants, 
ppellee. 
of Florida, 
awarded lump* 
total disability 
peal was taken. 
»al, Shivers, J., 
on maximum 
ot binding, and 
: occurrence of 
ment so as to 
ainst property the 
seding. Compare 
v. City of Zephyr* 
Z\ 1986). constru-
ia Statutes, as to 
dcr § 329.01. F5. 
ROBY BY AND THROUGH ROBY r. KINGSLEY Fla. 7 8 9 
Qt«M4*2SdJ47*9 (FlmJip+lDi*. 1**) 
1. Stipulations ^»14(10) 
Stipulation between parties to workers' 
compensation case as to date of maximum 
medical improvement was not binding 
where facts presented at hearing on award 
of lump-sum advance of permanent total 
disability benefits were at variance with 
the stipulation. 
2. Workers' Compensation <*»1638 
Record failed to support occurrence of 
maximum medical improvement to support 
award of lump-sum advance of permanent 
total disability benefits. 
Mary E. Ingley, Tallahassee, for appel-
lant/Special Disability Trust Fund. 
Gerald W. Pierce of Henderson, Frank-
lin, Starnes & Holt, F t Myers, for appel-
lants/Ingram's Hardware and State Farm 
Ins. 
Richard L Cervelli, Richard I. Cervelli 
P.-A-, Naples, for appellee. 
SHIVERS, Judge. 
The Special Disability Trust Fund, In-
gram's Hardware (employer) and State 
Farm Insurance Company (carrier) appeal 
the deputy commissioner's award of a 
lump-sum advance of permanent total dis-
ability benefits to Paul D. Myers (claimant) 
for injuries sustained on April 10, 1981. 
We reverse. 
A lump-sum advance is not properly 
awarded before a claimant has reached 
maximum medical improvement (MMI). 
Butler's Dairy, Inc. v. Honey cutt, 432 
So.2d 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); City of St 
Petersburg Beach v. Harper, 8 FCR 333 
(1974); Section 440.20(12Xa), Florida Stat-
utes (1981). In this case the parties have stip-
ulated to MMI as of January 11, 1984. The 
deputy commissioner approved the stipula-
tion and incorporated it by reference in his 
orders. However, the record fails to sup-
port the occurrence of MMI. 
Although the psychologist did testify 
claimant reached psychological MMI on 
January 11, 1984, the psychiatrist testified 
claimant had not yet reached MMI but 
migpt within six months of February 20, 
1984. No findings as to MMI for physical 
problems were made by the neurologist or 
any| other doctor. 
[1,2] The January 11, 1984 date is not 
binding when the facts presented at the 
hearing are at variance with, and show 
good cause for modification of the stipula-
tion. Espada Enterprises, Inc. v. SpirQ, 
481 So.2d 1263, 1268 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); 
Leeks Shoes v. Cucuzza, 429 So.2d 401, 402 
(FlaL 1st DCA 1983); Woods v. Greater 
Naples Care Center, 406 So.2d 1172, 1173 
(FlaL 1st DCA 1981), rev. denied, 413 So.2d 
876 (Fla.1982). The lump-sum advance 
must be reversed under Butler's Dairy 
because the evidence fails to support the 
occurrence of MMI regardless of the stipu-
lated date. 
REVERSED. 
EkVIN and THOMPSON, JJ.f concur. 
(p f «T»UWHtVWt«> 
Santiuel N. ROBY, a minor, By and 
Through his natural parent and guardi-
aji, Judith R. ROBY, and Judith R. 
Roby, Individually, Appellants, 
r. 
Lee KINGSLEY and Barry 
Ratliff, Appellees. 
No. BH-499. 
district Court of Appeal of Florida, 
First District. 
Aug. 7, 1986. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1986. 
Automobile passenger, who was in-
jured when automobile struck trailer-rig 
7 9 0 ETa. 492 SOUTU&ltif i ^ r v i v i & m +** t»«»*~w 
parked in emergency lane, and his mother 
brought suit against driver of automobile 
and driver of rig. The Circuit Court, Ala-
chua County, John J. Crews, J., entered 
judgment in favor of plaintiff against auto-
mobile driver and against plaintiffs and in 
favor of driver of rig, and plaintiffs appeal-
ed The District Court of Appeal, Shivers, 
J«, held that: (1) evidence that rig was 
illegally parked partially in emergency lane 
and failed to display required triangular 
reflector entitled passenger to standard 
concurring cause instruction, and (2) pas-
senger was entitled to examine his expert 
about highway design and construction and 
specific purpose of emergency lane to pro-
vide reasonable opportunity for recovery of 
out-of-control vehicle, in order to determine 
whether automobile driver should have 
been able to recover from drifting into 
emergency lane. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Automobiles <t»246<57) 
Evidence that tractor-trailer rig was 
illegally parked partially in emergency lane 
and failed to display required triangular 
reflector behind rig at time rig was struck 
by automobile, resulting in injury to pas-
senger, entitled passenger to standard con-
curring cause instruction, in action brought 
against driver of rig and driver of automo-
bile. West's F.S.A. § 316.194 (now § 316.-
124); § 316.301. 
2. Appeal and Error ^1060.1(2), 1067 
Jury may have been misled by trial 
court's failure to give concurrent cause in-
struction and by argument of counsel for 
driver of tractor-trailer rig that, in order to 
find driver of rig liable, jury was required 
to determine that driver of rig was the 
clause of accident, thus entitling passenger 
to a new trial, in action against driver of 
automobile which struck rig and driver of 
rig, since jury could have been misled into 
believing that, if automobile driver's negli-
gence was more significant cause of injury, 
dnver of rig would be relieved of liability. 
3. Automobiles «=»242(7) 
In order for driver of tractor-trailer rig 
to be liable for injuries to passenger of 
automobile which struck rig while it was 
illegally parked, passenger did not have to 
prove that driver of rig caused accident, 
but only that his conduct, in combination 
with act of automobile driver, caused acci-
dent 
4. Evidence e»514(2) 
Automobile passenger injured when 
automobile collided with parked tractor-
trailer rig was entitled to examine his ex-. 
pert about highway design and construc-
tion and specific purpose of emergency 
lane to provide reasonable opportunity for 
recovery of out-of-control vehicle, in order 
to determine whether defendant automobile 
driver should have been able to recover 
from drifting into emergency lane, and 
automobile driver's expert should have 
been permitted to testify as to whether 
parked tractor*trailer was concurring cause 
of accident, in action brought against auto-
mobile driver and driver of rig, as such 
testimony would have had direct bearing on 
issue of concurring causation. 
5. Damages <^ »170 
Evidence that passenger injured when 
automobile collided with parked tractor-
trailer rig had prior homosexual relation-
ship was irrelevant on issue of injuries and 
was inadmissible, in action arising from 
accident. 
6. Evidence «=»146 
Even if evidence of prior homosexual 
relationship of automobile passenger in-
jured in accident were relevant, it would be 
inadmissible, in action brought by passen-
ger arising from accident, on basis that 
value of such evidence would be substan-
tially outweighed by danger of unfair prej-
udice. West's F.S.A. § 90.403. 
7. Appeal and Error <$=»1050.2 
Trial court's error in admitting evi-
dence of automobile passenger's prior ho-
mosexual relationship, in action arising 
from automobile accident, required rever-
sal, since evidence was irrelevant to his 
injuries and could have been prejudicial. 
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8. Damages <^ »135 
Award of $50,000 to mother of passen-
ger injured in automobile accident was 
clearly inadequate, in light of uncontradict-
ed evidence that mother incurred $170,000 
in past medical expenses for passenger be-
fore he reached majority. 
Larry Beltz and Samuel Newman of L.D. 
Beltz SL Associates, St Petersburg and 
Edna L Caruso, West Palm Beach, for 
appellants. 
Robert A. White and John D. Jopling of 
Dell, Graham, Willcox, Barber, Henderson 
& Cates, Gainesville, for appellees. 
SHIVERS, Judge. 
This is an appeal by plaintiffs, Samuel N. 
Roby and his mother Judith R. Roby, from 
a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and a final 
costs judgment against plaintiffs entered 
upon a jury verdict in a negligence action. 
Whether refusal to instruct the jury with 
Standard Jury Instruction 5.1b on concur-
ring cause was error, 2) Whether limiting 
the examination of experts by plaintiffs' 
counsel was error, 3) Whether admitting 
evidence that the plaintiff had a prior ho-
mosexual relationship was error, 4) Wheth-
er the damages awarded plaintiffs were 
inadequate. 
Samuel N. Roby (plaintiff/appellant) was 
16 years old when he sustained brain dam-
age while a hitchhiker passenger in a ve-
hicle driven by intoxicated Barry Ratliff 
(defendant/appellee). The car collided at 
night with the rear of a tractor-trailer rig 
parked in the emergency lane of the high-
way. Lee Kingsley (defendant/appellee), 
the driver and operator of the rig, was 
improperly parked in the emergency lane 
VtoiouX reflects earning deVices. 
I. Standard Jury Instruction 5.1b reads as fol-
lows: 
In* order to be regarded as a legal cause of 
[loss] [injury] [or] [damage], negligence need 
not be the only cause. Negligence may be a 
legal cause of [loss] [injury] [or] [damage] 
492S0.2*-19 
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Samuel Roby and his mother sued Ratliff 
and Kingsley for damages. A default was 
entered against Ratliff. Kingsley was re-
turned a jury verdict of no negligence. Fi-
lial judgment was entered in favor of plain-
oils and against Ratliff in the amount of 
^700,000 for Samuel Roby and $50,000 for 
Judith Roby, and against plaintiff in favor 
of Kingsley. A final costs judgment was 
entered for Kingsley and against plaintiffs 
fbr $6,658. 
The first issue on appeal is whether the 
court erred in refusing to give Standard 
Jury Instruction 5.1b on concurring cause.1 
The purpose of the concurring cause in-
struction is to negate the idea that a de-
fendant is excused from the consequences 
of his negligence by reason of some other 
cause concurring in time and contributing 
to the same damage. Little v. Miller, 311 
9o.2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). 
In Ruiz v. Cold Storage and Insulation 
Contractors, Inc., 306 So.2d 153 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1975) cert denied, 316 So.2d 2S6 (Fla. 
1975U the court held it was. error for a trial 
judge not to instruct the jury on concurrent 
causation when two criteria are met. First, 
the facts as viewed most favorably to the 
plaintiff support the need for such an in-
struction, and second, the failure to give 
the instruction may mislead the jury. Id. 
See also, Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So.2d 
1216, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), Little v. 
MilUr, 311 So.2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). 
The trial court's refusal to give a concur-
ring cause instruction in Ruiz was error 
because the jury could have reasonably 
concluded in the absence of such an in-
struction that they must return a verdict 
for the more negligent of the two negligent 
drivers involved in the intersection colli-
Ruiz, 306 So.2d at 154. on. 
[1] Applying the facis of this case to 
die first Ruiz criterion, the record suffi-
vpxt&y 4%?rrtrTiVcr2rf££> *&% powA&fty t>£ zvti-
even though it operates in combination with 
[the act of another] [some natural cause] [or] 
some other cause if such other cause occurs at 
the same time as the negligence and if the 
negligence contributes substantially to pro-
ducing such [loss] [injury] [or] [damage]. 
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current negligence on the part of Kingsley 
to warrant the requested instruction. 
Kingsley was illegally parked partially in 
the emergency lane in violation of Section 
316.194, Florida Statutes and failed to dis-
play the required triangular reflectors be-
hind his vehicle as required by Section 316.-
301, Florida Statutes. 
[2] As to the second Ruiz criterion, the 
trial court's failure to give the concurrent 
cause instruction might very well have mis-
led the jury. Standard Jury Instruction 
5.1a2 does not address concurring causes 
and the jury was not instructed about joint 
and several liability. The concurring cause 
instruction would have specifically dis-
pelled any erroneous belief by the jury that 
they must find only one legal cause of the 
plaintiffs' damages. In this particular 
case, the jury may also have been misled 
by the fact that defendant Ratliff was 
found liable by default as a matter of law. 
It is not difficult to imagine that the jury 
could have believed Ratliff s liability as a 
matter of law excused any liability on the 
part of Kingsley. 
[3] The jury may also have been misled 
by the following closing argument of 
Kingsley's counsel: 
. . . [t]he Court is going to tell you that in 
order to find an individual, in this case 
Mr. Kingsley, at fault, you not only need 
to determine that he was negligent but 
that his negligence was the cause of the 
accident It's a two step process. 
You've got to find not only that he was 
negligent, but you have to find that his 
negligence caused the accident (Em-
phasis added). 
In fact plaintiff did not have to prove that 
Kingsley caused the accident only that his 
conduct in combination with the act of 
another, caused the accident We conclude 
the jury may have believed that both driv-
ers were negligent but the jury could have 
been misled into believing that Ratliffs 
2. Standard Jury Instruction 5.1a reads as fol-
lows: 
Negligence is a legal cause of [loss] [injury] 
[or] [damage] if it directly and in natural and 
continuous sequence produces or contributes 
negligence, as the more significant "cause" 
of the injury, relieved Kingsley of any lia-
bility. We therefore conclude from the evi-
dence and the absence of a concurring 
cause instruction that the jury could well 
have been misled. Based on this error, a 
new trial on all the issues is awarded. 
[4] The second issue oh appeal is 
whether limiting the examination of ex-
perts by plaintiffs' counsel on the issue of 
causation was error. We hold that it was. 
Plaintiffs' expert should have been allowed 
to testify about highway design and con-
struction, specifically the purpose of an 
emergency lane to provide a reasonable 
opportunity for recovery of an out of con-
trol vehicle. The jury should have had this 
information to determine whether Ratliff 
would have been able to recover from drift-
ing into the emergency lane. Defendant's 
expert should have been allowed to testify 
as to whether the parked tractor-trailer 
was a concurring cause of the accident 
This excluded evidence had a direct bearing 
on the issue of concurring causation. 
[5-7] The third issue on appeal is 
whether evidence of Samuel Roby's prior 
homosexual relationship was properly ad-
mitted at trial. We reverse on the basis 
that the evidence was irrelevant to his inju-
ries and could have been prejudicial Even 
if it were relevant it would be inadmissible 
since its value would be substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Section 90.403, Florida Statutes. 
We reverse the fourth issue on appeal on 
the basis that the damages awarded plain-
tiffs were inadequate. Since defendant 
Kingsley was found not liable on the trial 
level, the issue of inadequate damages is 
raised only as to defendant Ratliff. How-
ever, because reversal based on the lack of 
a concurring cause instruction necessitates 
Kingsley's retrial on the issue of liability, 
damages may be assessed against Kingsley 
if he is subsequently found liable. 
substantially to producing such [loss] [injury] 
[or] [damage], so that it can reasonably be 
said that, but for the negiigen«, the [loss] 
[injury 1 [or J [damage] would not have oc-
curred. 
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f clearly inadequate in light of the uncontra-dicted evidence that she incurred $170,000 
in past medical expenses for her son before 
he reached majority. Where the award is 
less than the undisputed medicals, the 
award is inadequate. Stroker v. Lynch, 
335 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert 
denied, 341 So.2d 1083 (Fla.1977). Rever-
sal of the other issues on appeal could 
result in a greater damages award for 
Samuel Roby. 
REVERSED and REMANDED for a new 
trial including damages. 
ZEHMER and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. 
(O f UTWUWmSttUH^ 
Isaac YOUNGBLOOD, Appellant, 
r. 
STATE of Florida, Appellee. 
No. BF-32. 
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
First District. 
Aug. 7, 1986. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted of sexual bat-
tery and lewd assault on a child in the 
Circuit Court, Columbia County, Royce Ag-
ner, J.f and he appealed. The District 
Court of Appeal, Barfield, J., held that 
conviction for sexual battery could not be 
sustained on testimony of child protection 
team interviewer concerning knowledge 
and 'traits of child and opinion that child 
was sexually abused by father. 
Reversed. 
be 
U i A l t t 
O U M 492 6*24793 (FUuApp. 1 Dt*. 1986) 
[8] Judith Roby's award of 550,000 is Criminal Law <*=»494 
4 7 0 
Conviction for sexual battery could not 
sustained on testimony of child protec-
tion team interviewer that child demon-
strated knowledge, personality traits, and 
conduct consistent with sexually abused 
children and opinion that child was sexually 
abused by father, determination that de-
fendant had penetrated or had union with 
miuth or anus of child with penis or other 
object could come only from conjecture 
bajsed upon inferences drawn by interview-
er! from interview with victim. West's 
F.&.A. §§ 800.02 et seq., 827.01 et seq. 
iMichael E. Allen, Public Defender, and 
Kathleen Stover, Asst Public Defender, 
Tallahassee, for appellant. 
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Norma J. 
Mungenast, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, 
for appellee. 
BARFIELD, Judge. 
Defendant, Isaac Youngblood, appeals 
his convictions for sexual battery under 
cqunt I and lewd assault on a child under 
ccjunt II. After a thorough review of the. 
record, we find no error in defendant's 
conviction under count II for lewd assault 
oik a child and his sentence to 15 years 
imprisonment 
As to the conviction for count I, we do 
nit believe an exposition of the seamy de-
tails of the record in this case will serve 
ahy useful purpose as those details are 
"already known to the parties. Neither do 
we need to address numerous evidentiary 
errors in this record as our disposition of 
the appeal may rest on the record as sub-
mitted to the jury. 
I When the trial judge precluded the jury 
fjk>m considering the testimony of Dr. Eliz-
zbeth EngleharZ as it reteted to statement 
niade by Jason Youngblood as substantive 
evidence of Jason's identification of his fa-
ther as the perpetrator of a sexual battery 
against him, the jury was left only with the 
testimony of Linda Cooper from which to 
conclude that a sexual battery had oc-
EXHIBIT C 
Rule 404. 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE 
TO PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; 
OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. [Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of his character is not admissi-
ble for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except:! 
* * * 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Actsi Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be; admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ibsence of mis-
take or accident. 
JA 77 
Rule 608, 
EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AN >^ 
CONDUCT OF WITNESS 
* * 
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct^ Specific in-
stances of the conduct of a witness, for $ie purpose of 
attacking or supporting his credibility, oth^r than convic-
tion of crime as provided in rule 609, ma}' nbt be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in tjhe discretion of 
the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the fitness (1) con-
cerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or 
(2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness of another witness as to which character the witness 
being cross-examined has testified. 
